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The increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (Hitt et al., 2001), especially in high-tech and science-based
sectors, has raised concerns for policymakers that the innovative activity of target ﬁrms could be reduced and shifted abroad
(Bertrand, 2009; UNCTAD, 2005). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions accounted for 28% of the total volume of mergers
and acquisitions in 2013 (Dealogic, 2014). Not only is this a signiﬁcant percentage, but the issue is notmerely quantitative, it is
also qualitative, as it reﬂects growing interdependence between economies and has important implications for spillovers for
regions and countries. An example is the strong reaction from stakeholders to the (U.S.) Pﬁzer’s takeover bid for the (UK-
Swedish) AstraZeneca. Expressing concerns to the UK government, the chairman of the Wellcome Trust (the largest UK
medical research foundation) was quoted as saying: “Pﬁzer’s past acquisitions of major pharmaceutical companies have led to
substantial reduction in R&D activity, which we are concerned could be replicated in this instance (Financial Times, 8 May
2014).
There is much evidence that multinationals tend to concentrate their more strategic activities, such as the higher value-
added R&D, at home, due to their embeddedness in their national systems of innovation and need for internal cohesion (Blanc
and Sierra, 1999; Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Zanfei, 2000). Nevertheless, there is also evidence of a shift in the role of R&D abroad,
from just supporting local business units and adapting products or processes to foreign markets, to improving home country
technological assets or acquiring new technological assets (Dunning,1994; Kuemmerle, 1999; Pearce, 1999). Foreign locations
can provide access to complementary location-speciﬁc advantages from, for example, centers of excellence in research or
suppliers, offering the potential for technological developments (Cantwell, 1995). For ﬁrms, access to tacit knowledge from
other locations, and the combination of this knowledge d much of which is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and affected by path dependent
conditions in the host country or region d with its own knowledge is important to facilitate the exploration of new tech-
nologies and development of their capabilities.
The refocusing of the international business literature on spatial aspects of foreign direct investment (Cantwell, 2009) has
brought attention to the complex organizational strategies in internationally-integratedmultinationals (Bartlett and Ghoshal,
1989; Doz, 1986), the evolution of subsidiary roles (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Frost et al., 2002; Miozzo and Yamin, 2012),
and the growing importance of asset-seeking strategies by multinationals (Dunning, 1995). This literature underlines the
signiﬁcance of location as a source of competitive advantage for the multinational (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Nachumhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2015.07.002
0024-6301/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
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sidiaries (Kuemmerle, 1999; Pearce, 1999; Phene and Almeida, 2008). Nevertheless, it neglects the R&D reorganization
process following cross-border M&As. Cross-border M&As constitute a large share of foreign direct investment, and are an
important strategy for companies to expand abroad (Andersen, 1997; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Child et al., 2001;
Inkpen et al., 2000; Seth et al., 2002; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Research, however, lags behind the pace of growth
of such international diversiﬁcation strategy (Shimizu et al., 2004).
In this paper, we focus onwhat happens with the technological resources of target ﬁrmswhen they are acquired by foreign
ﬁrms. We explore under what conditions foreign acquirers offer funding and complementary assets to develop the R&D
projects of the target ﬁrms. Using a knowledge-based approach to the analysis of M&As (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004;
Paruchuri and Eisenman, 2012), we explore how knowledge relatedness inﬂuences the reduction and relocation of the target
ﬁrms’ technological assets in the acquirers’ home country, or the further investment in these assets in the host country. We
draw on an in-depth case study of six acquisitions of UK biopharmaceutical ﬁrms.
We develop an analytical framework that elucidates how key determinants of the knowledge base of science-based ﬁrms,
and their combinations through M&As, interact and affect post-acquisition investment in the target’s R&D projects. Earlier
studies have explored the role of knowledge relatedness between acquiring and target ﬁrm as an important determinant of
innovation outcomes (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Makri et al., 2010). Our research draws on, but also extends, these studies. In
particular, our work builds on the insight that similarity and complementarity of technology have an effect on innovation
outcomes following acquisition, but goes beyond this by incorporating into the framework the important role played by
similarity and complementarity of capabilities between ﬁrms in affecting innovation outcomes. We argue that these two
constructs d the complementarity/similarity of technology, and the complementarity/similarity of discovery and develop-
ment capabilities of the target and acquiring ﬁrm d interact to produce different outcomes in terms of investment in the
acquired ﬁrm’s R&D projects and for the local science and technology system. This framework can encompass the different
motives, processes and outcomes in technology-motivated M&As, and is therefore able to cast light on mechanisms ignored
by earlier studies. We show that a knowledge-based view can potentially illuminate the rationale and effects of M&As on
target innovation.
In the next section, we review the literature on M&As, knowledge relatedness and innovation. Subsequently we detail the
research design and methods, present and discuss the ﬁndings, and follow with a conclusion.
Knowledge and mergers and acquisitions
The knowledge-based view of the ﬁrm regards the ﬁrm as a collection of difﬁcult-to-imitate knowledge assets, and argues
that through experience ﬁrms develop a knowledge base that leads to a set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capabilities that enhance ﬁrm
performance. Knowledge assets include explicit knowledge (comprising systematized knowledge in, for example, manuals,
patents, or databases) or tacit knowledge (in shared, common experience embedded in idiosyncratic “routines” such as
behavioral regularities and operating procedures, or in symbolic language such as design) (Cyert and March, 1963; Nonaka,
1994; Winter, 1964). Innovation is seen as the result of ﬁrms’ combinative or dynamic capabilities to generate new applica-
tions from existing knowledge (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece et al.,
1997). Firms can only accumulate these capabilities by engaging in knowledge creation or search activities, which are un-
certain activities. Knowledge search processes tend to be localized, and knowledge development is often ﬁrm-speciﬁc and
industry-speciﬁc, tacit and cumulative, appropriable by speciﬁc ﬁrms, and tied to local institutions (Arthur, 1989; Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1969; David, 1985; Dosi, 1982; Gertler, 2003; Nelson and Winter, 1977; Polanyi, 1966). For ﬁrms, access to tacit
knowledge from outside their geographic environments (Jaffe et al., 1993; Mansﬁeld, 1995) and the combination of this
knowledged often sticky, embodied in the employees of local ﬁrms, and in the knowledge ﬂows between ﬁrms and other
organizations (Lundvall, 1988; Saxenian, 1994)dis crucial for increasing the breadth of search, exploration of new technol-
ogies, and the development of new technological capabilities (Laursen, 2012; March, 1991).
Scholars have used knowledge-based perspectives to study strategic alliances and M&As. The rapid growth in techno-
logical knowledge, and the increasing need to integrate multiple technologies from different sources, is challenging for even
the largest corporations (Granstrand and Sj€olander, 1990). The integration of externally sourced technology assets with
internally developed assets is increasingly important (Graebner et al., 2010; Puranam et al., 2006; Ranft and Lord, 2002).
Extant work on alliances focuses on ﬁrms’ technological knowledge as a determinant of partner selection and the future
trajectory of each partner’s innovation activity (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Inkpen and Crossan, 1995;
Khanna et al., 1998; Larsson et al., 1998). Similarly, the M&A literature acknowledges M&As as one of the main ways for ﬁrms
to create value by gaining access to new knowledge and capabilities, or by a synergy of complementary productive resources
(Hagedoorn, 2002; Inkpen et al., 2000; King et al., 2008; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Sleuwaegen and Valenti, 2006;
Uhlenbruck et al., 2006).
Strategy and technology management studies have focused on the impact of M&As on innovation and its determinants.
They argue that M&As enable scale and scope economies in R&D and shorter innovation lead times (Cassiman et al., 2005);
they help ﬁrms enter new technology and markets complementing internal R&D resources (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001);
they facilitate reorganization of their R&D efforts among different research centers; they facilitate greater internal ﬁnance for
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output (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Desyllas and Hughes, 2010). Nevertheless, M&As can also lead to reduction in research due to
reduced competition (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982), and to the reorganization of business units, thus disrupting R&D de-
partments (Puranam et al., 2006; Ranft and Lord, 2002). They restrain inventors’ abilities to seek, process and recombine
research knowledge due to uncertainty (Paruchuri and Eisenman, 2012), and cause managers to postpone decisions
regarding long-term R&D investments, changing the emphasis from strategic issues to ﬁnancial control (Hitt et al., 1991,
1996).
In particular, researchers have focused on the role of knowledge relatedness between acquiring and target ﬁrms as an
important determinant of acquisition outcomes. These studies reason that an acquisition expands a ﬁrm’s knowledge base
and has positive effects on innovation, but integration of a new knowledge base also disrupts established routines
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Haspelagh and Jemison, 1991; Puranam et al., 2006). This is justiﬁed by the concept of absorptive
capacity, which suggests that the ability to use new information and to learn is enhanced when newly acquired knowledge is
related to existing knowledge; i.e., when there are common skills, shared languages and similar cognitive structures (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990; King et al., 2008; Nonaka, 1994; Zahra and George, 2002). Smooth absorption of the related knowledge
and inventive recombination (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996) enhances the capacity to recognize the value of new infor-
mation and exploit it commercially. Similarly, Puranam et al. (2006) showed that the existence of “common ground” in
technology knowledge between the acquiring and acquired ﬁrms facilitates the acquisition integration process. If the
innovation routines of the ﬁrms are different, then the integration of knowledge is disruptive and requires greater effort to
adapt and integrate, resulting in radical changes in the ways of organizing research. If the knowledge bases of the ﬁrms are
similar, then there is little contribution to innovation performance, incurring cost of transfer without knowledge enrichment
(Ghoshal, 1987; Hitt et al., 1996). In sum, M&As improve innovation performance when the technological knowledge of the
acquiring and acquired ﬁrms is similar enough to facilitate learning, but different enough to provide opportunities to enrich
the acquiring ﬁrm’s knowledge base.
Ahuja and Katila (2001) found that relatedness of acquired and acquiring ﬁrms’ knowledge bases (as measured by overlap
of cited patents) in technology-related acquisitions has a curvilinear impact on the acquiring ﬁrm’s innovation output (patent
counts). Extending Ahuja and Katila’s analysis, Cloodt et al. (2006) found evidence conﬁrming the curvilinear relationship
between relatedness and innovation output for technology-related acquisitions. Cassiman et al. (2005) found that M&As
involving ﬁrms with complementary technologies result in greater R&D efﬁciency post acquisition. When acquiring and
acquired ﬁrms are technological substitutes, they decrease their R&D level post-acquisition, and R&D reduction is more
prominent than when there are complementary technologies.
Makri et al. (2010) built on these insights, and examined not only the effect of the relatedness of the technological
knowledge but also that of the science base. Using a sample of 95 high-technology acquisitions in the drug, chemical and
electronics industries, they differentiated between similarity and complementarity in both science (scientiﬁc disciplines and
research communities) and technology (patents). Firms acquiring other ﬁrms with complementary science and technology
knowledge produced higher quality and more novel inventions. This study suggests that when a ﬁrm acquires a target with
similar technologies (and based in similar areas of science), integration is easier but the amount of novel inventions are
lower. When acquisitions involve similarity in technology and complementarity in science, they lead to more novel in-
ventions only.
Although these studies have improved our understanding of technology-driven M&As, there are two particular areas that
have attracted less attention. First, few studies have focused on the effects of M&As on the target ﬁrms’ innovation activity.
Ernst and Vitt (2000) found that among acquired German R&D-performing ﬁrms, about 30% of key inventors left the com-
pany, or those who stayed were less inventive. Calderini et al. (2003) focused on the acquisition of U.S. high-tech ﬁrms, and
investigated the effects of acquisitions on inventive performance. They found that the patent activity of the acquired ﬁrms
contracted compared to a control sample of non-acquired ﬁrms. Graebner (2004) studied the post-acquisition integration of
eight technology ﬁrms, and found that post-acquisition outcomes and synergies depended on whether managers of the
acquired ﬁrms remained involved in their units’ projects and were entrusted with cross-organizational responsibilities. From
another study on the acquisitions of U.S. ﬁrms in the semiconductor industry, Kapoor and Lim (2007) concluded that there is a
curvilinear relationship between the innovation productivity of the acquired ﬁrm’s inventors and the overlap of technical
skills in the acquiring and acquired ﬁrms. These studies suggest that some complementarity in technological knowledge is
beneﬁcial for the combined post-acquisition innovation performance.
Second, we know little about what happens with cross-border M&As and innovation. An expectation is that the positive
and negative effects of domestic M&As may be enhanced. Cross-border M&As enable access to a wider set of resources
residing in different country boundaries (Inkpen et al., 2000; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Vaara et al. (2012) found evi-
dence among Finnish ﬁrms that national cultural differences between the acquiring and acquired ﬁrms were positively
associated with learning from knowledge transfer. They argued that national cultural differences allowed access to diverse
knowledge and capability repositories, and that most managers appeared to be knowledgeable in managing national dif-
ferences. However, there is a danger that acquiring ﬁrms may centralize R&D in the home country, to enable economies of
scale in research and avoid the costs of coordinating dispersed R&D centers (Kumar, 2001). As a result, the innovative activity
of the target ﬁrm could be reduced or shifted away, thereby reducing the potential of R&D as a source of innovation and
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found that acquisitions of French ﬁrms by foreign ﬁrms increased external and internal R&D expenditure of the acquired
French ﬁrms. There was more contracting out to local public laboratories and universities. The growth of the R&D budget was
ﬁnanced by not only internal resources, but also by the acquiring ﬁrm. Thus, results are inconclusive as to how foreign ac-
quisitions affect innovation in the acquired ﬁrm and the local science and technology system.
Our study addresses this gap in the literature by exploring what happens with the technological resources of science-
based ﬁrms when they are acquired by foreign ﬁrms. We focus on a set of resources d the R&D projects of the acquired
ﬁrms d and ask under what conditions their development is continued in the host country. We ask how and why foreign
acquirers offer long-term funding and complementary assets to develop the distinctive technologies of the acquired ﬁrms.
Given the important role of tacit knowledge in science-based ﬁrms and the high degree of embeddedness, cross-border
acquisitions and their impact on the target’s innovation are likely to depend on and affect the local science and technol-
ogy system.
Research design and methods
The purpose of this study is to build theory inductively. We use a multiple case study design to improve the richness and
accuracy of the conceptual insights (Yin, 2003). Adopting a detailed, in-depth approach is appropriate given the relative lack
of theoretical and empirical attention to the relation between cross-border M&As and investment in the acquired ﬁrm’s
technology. In this way, we study not only the impact of cross-border M&As on investment in the target ﬁrm’s technology but
also how the target ﬁrm’s technology is developed post-acquisition.
Research setting
We focus on the acquisitions of six biopharmaceutical ﬁrms in the Cambridge, Oxford, andManchester areas in the UK. The
biopharmaceutical industry is an ideal setting for our study for two reasons. First, our research question focuses on the effect
of cross-border acquisitions on the continued investment and development of acquired technological assets of science-based
ﬁrms. Biopharmaceutical ﬁrms operate upstream in the value chain or product-development trajectory, generate product-
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge and represent the complexity of R&D in science-based businesses. Science-based ﬁrms confront
speciﬁc challenges, including an unusually high-risk proﬁle and longer-term horizons compared to ﬁrms inmedium-tech and
other high-tech sectors. Every R&D project is an experiment. R&D in science-based ﬁrms is about successively reducing
uncertainty by acquiring, selecting and screening information: a highly iterative and inductive process. This is unlike other
high-tech industries where products evolve through design-test iterations (Pisano, 2006). As argued by Pisano (2006, 151):
“Biotechnology is quite different from semiconductors and software. The pieces of the drug discovery puzzle are often not
modular, but constitute a set of interdependent problems. Subtle interactions between a target, a molecule’s structure and its
physical properties, dosage form, the manufacturing process, the dose, and the patient population can profoundly inﬂuence
the performance of a drug.” Science-based ﬁrms require appropriate mechanisms to integrate cross-disciplinary skills and
capabilities to identify targets, develop molecules, develop formulations, design clinical trials, choose the target population
and select the manufacturing process. Each technological/scientiﬁc choice has implications on other choices. This makes
integration of R&D and technology knowledge and processes across ﬁrm boundaries (and across country boundaries) very
difﬁcult (Schweizer, 2005).
Secondly, since the early 1990s, there is evidence of a high degree of organizational experimentation, including M&As and
strategic alliances, in biopharmaceuticals (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Pisano, 1991). It has become increasingly apparent
that technology-motivated acquisition of biopharmaceutical companies is not simply limited to acquisition by large phar-
maceutical ﬁrms, but that acquisitions are increasingly important for the growth of medium-sized and large biopharma-
ceutical companies, as they are acquiring (generally smaller) biotech companies with complementary technologies,
capabilities and markets. Biopharmaceutical ﬁrms need extensive amounts of funding to develop their drug products, and
they generally raise funding fromventure capitalists and public equity. However, the R&D cost of bringing a new drug product
to market often exceeds the amount these funding sources can supply. Biopharmaceutical ﬁrms therefore seek to partner,
merge, or be acquired by other ﬁrms (including foreign ﬁrms) that can support their drug development, both with ﬁnancial
and complementary resources.
Case selection
To yield more generalizable and robust insights (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), we selected our sample from a large
group of acquisitions we identiﬁed by scanning the trade press from 2006 to 2010, for foreign acquisitions of British bio-
pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Following recommendations to ground the insights of inductive studies on a diverse sample
(Sigglekow, 2007), we built a sample that was balanced and varied in terms of the types of technological assets acquired (drug
development programs, diagnostics and services), the size of acquirer and target ﬁrms, and the value of the acquisition deal
(Table 1). We applied the logic of theoretical sampling, as opposed to a sampling logic for statistical generalization (Flick,
2007; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). We selected six acquisition cases. In the ﬁrst ﬁve cases, the acquirers were large and
small ﬁrms from a range of countries, including Australia, Belgium, Germany and the U.S. The sixth case involved a domestic
Table 1
Sample ﬁrm characteristics
Deal characteristicsa Acquirer characteristicsb UK target characteristicsb
Case Year
of deal
Deal value
($2005
million)
Assets acquired Reasons to sell Country of
incorporation
No. of
employees
Year of
foundation
R&D ($2005
million)
No. of
employees
Year of
foundation
Total funding
raiseda,b ($2005
million)
1 2006 15.4  ADME technology
and expertise
 Data library
 Exit for investors Belgium 201 2003 8.3 17 2001 91
2 2010 8.4  Drug programs in
Phase I and Phase II
 Stem cell research
 Exit for investors
 Restructuring of target
USA 300 1992 N.A. 70 1999 27
3 2008 18.8  Two Phase II drug
programs
 Access to resources for
further development of
drug programs
Germany 53 2000 12.3 13 1999 81
4 2009 9.1  Two pre-clinical
drug programs
 Site and expertise
in UK
 Access to complementary
skills for drug development
 Investment in further clinical
development of programs
Australia 70 1986 21.9 17 1999 26
5 2009 95 plus
35 against
milestones
 Diagnostic kit /product
and underlying platform
technology
 Access to resources and
capabilities to scale up
manufacturing and distribution
Germany 3495 1985 94.0 120 2001 5
6 2007 30.1  Two Phase II drug programs
 Platform technology
 Exit for investors
 Investment in developing
drug programs
UK 72 1999 33.0 30 2002 62
a Data obtained from target and acquirer press releases.
b Data obtained from DataStream and Fame databases as of 2010 (except R&D expenditure).
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border acquisition. In all of the cases, the acquisitions were technologically motivated. The general aims among the target
ﬁrms varied. Four out of the six target ﬁrms were motivated by sustaining their growth and gaining access to resources. The
other two target ﬁrms had later-stage products with disappointing trials and faced difﬁculties raising ﬁnance. Table 1 provides
an overview of the characteristics of the selected cases.
Data collection
We collected all the data between 2006 and 2013, using a window of two years before and after the acquisition date. The
time window of two years prior and post acquisition allowed us to make accurate judgments about the target ﬁrm’s pre- and
post-acquisition state. The combined use of three data collection mechanisms (semi-structured interviews, archival data, and
patent data) created a rich understanding of the subject matter. We held in-depth interviews with the founders and/or main
scientists on the premises of the target and acquirer ﬁrms. Interviews with senior management of both the target and the
buyer were conducted, providing dyad relationships in the sample. In each case, we identiﬁed the informants that had been
actively involved in the deal, and in the knowledge transfer process post-acquisition. Table 2 lists the interviews held with
target ﬁrms and buyer ﬁrms. The interviews lasted between two and three hours, allowing the authors to see how
knowledge-base combinations emerged as important determinants in science-based M&As, and to explain what happens to
the technological assets of science-based target ﬁrms.
In the initial interview protocol, we asked questions about 1) the nature of the business, products and technology and
collaborations pre-acquisition; 2) the events leading to the acquisition; 3) knowledge transfer between target and buyers; and
4) changes in the nature of the business, products and technology and collaborations post-acquisition. Following the constant
comparative method (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), over time we adjusted the interview protocol to reﬁne the theoretical
perspective, by asking questions on the technology of the target and acquirer, and on the discovery and development ca-
pabilities of the dyad ﬁrms.
All interviewswere recorded, transcribed and organized into a digital database.When salient issues emerged around some
of the emergent concepts, such as particular contradictory information between interviewee and patent data, we questioned
the respondents about these issues in follow-up interviews.
We also consulted archival data in order to triangulate and verify information gathered from informants. We used the
ﬁrms’ web sites and press releases to gather factual information about the M&A transaction, as well as other pertinent in-
formationd e.g., on partnerships, licensing or products, preceding and succeeding the M&A. We also used publicly available
databases, such as Datastream and Fame, to gather and verify facts about various ﬁrm characteristics d e.g., number of
employees, R&D budget.
Finally, in order to construct proxies for the technological knowledge of the acquiring and acquired ﬁrms, we collected
data on patented inventions, technology classes and categories, assignee names and inventor identity for the target and
acquirer ﬁrms from Thomson’s Delphion database. Because our sample of acquirers originates from different countries, and
because the biopharmaceutical industry is a global industry, we use data on international patent applications to the World
Intellectual Property Ofﬁce (WIPO). In this way, we try to deal with the well-documented differences across countries in
economic costs and beneﬁts of patents because of judicial, geographical and cultural factors (e.g., De Rassenfosse et al., 2013;
Desrochers, 1998; Pavitt, 1988). Indeed, it has been suggested that there is a growing number of patent applications via the
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) route (for evidence from Canada during the period 1990-2008, see Nikzad, 2011). When
international patent protection is sought, making a single initial patent application to WIPO under the PCTd which allows
applying for patent protection in a maximum of 145 nations d is advantageous compared with ﬁling multiple national
applications simultaneously under the Paris Convention (see World Intellectual Property Ofﬁce (WIPO), 2012). In particular,
ﬁling a PCT application is a simpler process. By having to deal with a single ofﬁce, it requires the applicant to comply with a
single set of formal requirements, and it reduces costs related to international patent protection (e.g., legal and translation
costs and national patent ofﬁce fees). Using WIPO patent data for our sample ﬁrms allows us to control for the “home bias”,
which arises because applicants tend to ﬁle more patents in their home country patent ofﬁce than in foreign patent ofﬁces (DeTable 2
Interviews with target and buyer ﬁrms
Target ﬁrm interviews Acquirer ﬁrm interviews
Case No. of interviews Position of interviewees No. of interviews Position of interviewee
1 3 SVP Drug Discovery, CFO and Team Manager 1 SVP Corporate Development
2 3 Founder and CSO 1 SVP R&D
3 1 CSO 1 Founder and CEO
4 1 CSO 1 VP Research
5 4 Founder and CSO 2 Head of Integration and CSO
6 2 CSO and Founder/executive director 1 SVP Commercial Development
Note: CEO: Chief Executive Ofﬁcer; CSO: Chief Scientiﬁc Ofﬁcer; CFO: Chief Financial Ofﬁcer; SVP: Senior Vice President; VP: Vice President; R&D: Research
and Development.
M. Miozzo et al. / Long Range Planning 49 (2016) 221e240 227Rassenfosse et al., 2013; OECD, 2004; Picci, 2010). There is also evidence that the PCT route is associated with higher value
patents (Van Zeebroeck and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2011). Not surprisingly, given the prominence of the U.S. market
in biopharmaceuticals, all 259 international patent applications made by our sample target and acquiring ﬁrms identiﬁed the
U.S.A. as one of the many designated nations for patent protection.1 Moreover, in order to account for the long time period
between the time of an invention and the granting of a patent, we consider WIPO patent applications by the original priority
date.2
We reﬁned our preliminary ﬁndings through discussions with practitioners at threeworkshops, organized jointly with the
University of Manchester Incubator Company, Babraham Bioscience Technologies and One Nucleus (East England biotech-
nology industry association), and Oxford Biotechnology Network. We also discussed ﬁndings with policymakers, including
representatives of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (UK), and UK Trade & Investment.
Data analysis
In inductive research, close adherence to the empirical data and their analysis by means of prior and emerging theoretical
constructs guides a disciplined reasoning toward the development of conceptual insights (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).
From analyzing the ﬁeld data, we identiﬁed the interrelated concepts that unfolded during the acquisitions of science-based
ﬁrms. Our inductive work went hand-in-hand with our data coding in a manner that let us identify the main determinants.
However, in order to ground the “intellectual leap” in the data, we considered in turn alternative explanations (Rerup and
Feldman, 2011). These alternative explanations included the importance of local research collaborations of the acquired
ﬁrms, the previous collaborations between the target and acquirer, and the efforts of knowledge exchange and organizational
integration between the target and acquirer. We constantly compared data and analysis, identifying emergent concepts and
comparing them with the relevant literature (Suddaby, 2006). We used cross-case comparative tabular displays to un-
scramble our empirical ﬁndings, and cluster and process our data (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
As we iterated between data and emerging logic, we gradually built a more reﬁned characterization of the constructs for
analysis. It became clear that we needed to examine the similarity/complementarity of the technology, as well as the sim-
ilarity/complementarity of discovery and development capabilities, which in the case of science-based ﬁrms strongly reﬂects
their knowledge base. Science-based ﬁrms are continuously integrating a variety of activities rooted in many technology and
scientiﬁc domains along an emergent technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982). Thus, we developed the construct of technology
similarity/complementarity to express whether the technological problem-solving of target and acquirer ﬁrms focused on the
same or different narrowly deﬁned areas of knowledge within a broader area of knowledge that they shared. This ﬁrst
construct was developed through examining case study data. All cases were technology-motivated mergers, and we asked
senior managers to explain the technology of the acquirer and target, and how and why technological problem-solving was
similar or complementary between acquirer and target. We also followed Makri et al. (2010) to construct measures of
technology similarity/complementarity based on patent data of the acquirer and target ﬁrm. Technology similarity is
calculated as the number of patents applied for by the acquirer (A) and the target (T) that are in the same patent class,
multiplied by the total number of patents the acquirer has in all common classes divided by total acquirer patents. Hence,
technology similarity is given by:
Overlap all patent classes
Total patents A&T

Total acquirer patents
in common classes
Total acquirer patentsTechnology complementarity is calculated using the number of patents in the same category but in different patent
classes, and given by:
Overlap all patent categories
Total patents A&T


Overlap all patent classes
Total patents A&T
 Total acquirer patents in common categories
Total acquirer patents
The measures of technology similarity and complementarity are weighted by the importance of each patent class for the
acquirer, in order to account for the fact that large ﬁrms tend to patent in various patent classes.3 Similar to previous work1 The WIPO receives a single patent application and is responsible for searching prior art and expressing an opinion regarding the patentability of the
invention. However, the ultimate responsibility of a patent grant lies with the designated national patent ofﬁces.
2 The priority date is the ﬁrst date of ﬁling of a patent application, anywhere in the world, to protect an invention.
3 Patent categories and classes are deﬁned using the hierarchical structure of the International Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC) system. For example, a broad
patent category of inventions related to “Heterocyclic compounds”, which is coded as C07D, consists of several more detailed classes, such as “Heterocyclic
compounds containing hydrogenated pyridine rings” which is coded as C07D 211.
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and target ﬁrms over the ﬁve-year period prior to the deal date. However, the well-documented general and biotechnology-
speciﬁc weaknesses in the use of patents as proxies for technological knowledge lead us to question the extent to which
patent data can accurately reﬂect biopharmaceutical ﬁrms’ knowledge bases.4 The indices developed from patent data
were compared with a careful case-by-case examination of data from the in-depth interviews. A follow-up interview was
made to clarify any discrepancy between patent and interview data regarding similarity and complementarity of the
technology.
A second construct that emerged inductively from our study is the similarity/complementarity of the discovery and
development capabilities between the ﬁrms. From the interviews, the nature of ﬁrms’ capabilities emerged as key features
of acquisition and reorganization decisions. Evolutionary theories of the ﬁrm (Nelson, 1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Winter, 1990), of which the capabilities perspective of the ﬁrm is one manifestation (Richardson, 1972; Teece et al.,
1997), argue that ﬁrms are repositories of organizational knowledge. The competitive advantage of ﬁrms rests on the
development and advancement of organizational capabilities and routines that are tacit, unique and difﬁcult to imitate.
Routines, which depend on individual skills, are the “building blocks” of organizational capabilities (Dosi et al., 2000;
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Zollo and Winter, 2002), and apply to most operational and strategic activities; they store
important coordinating information and organizational experience in a form that ﬁrms can transfer to new situations
(Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Pentland and Feldman, 2005). Organizational capabilities are collections of routines charac-
terized by ﬁrm-level outcomes, and they are identiﬁed with the knowledge that a ﬁrm possesses, so that it performs its
activities reliably or “solves” its problems and extends its actions (Dosi et al., 2000). These capabilities enable the ﬁrm to
provide the existing products or services, or develop new products or services. Within a science-based ﬁrm, the ﬁrm’s
“problem” is the purposeful search activity for new scientiﬁc products (such as drugs), and the identiﬁcation and linking of
technological options and market opportunities. In science-based environments, ﬁrms’ capabilities depend heavily on their
R&D resources. Coordination between R&D and other functions, and often with suppliers or partners, is needed to identify
and link options and opportunities. Several of these capabilities are hard-to-imitate because they are embedded in ﬁrms’
processes and historically bounded. Each R&D project is unique and demands an iterative process of activity integration for
drug development; e.g., pre-clinical and clinical trials, regulatory approval and the ﬁnal market launch, all of which
are highly interdependent. Despite the growing use of bioinformatics and computer-aided discovery, this process still
has a strong tacit dimension (Pisano, 2006) and, unlike many high-tech sectors, proximity to universities and industry
clusters matters for access to this cognitive tacit knowledge embedded in individuals (Balconi et al., 2007; Liebeskind et al.,
1996).
From our data, we derived a list of the relevant discovery and development capabilities in the ﬁrms under study. These
included organizational and managerial capabilities (including but not exclusively related to R&D) that support and
complement new product and process technologies emerging from R&D (Teece et al., 1997). There are many challenges in
conceptualizing routines or capabilities because of their distributed nature. The performance and interpretation of these
routines or capabilities occur at different levels of the organization, with different participants performing different ac-
tivities and having different understandings of them. Recognizing these limitations, we asked the interviewees to describe
the organizational and managerial capabilities of the target and acquirer ﬁrms in these areas prior to the acquisition.
The key ﬁrm capabilities that emerged were: ability to do clinical trials; safety and efﬁcacy testing; management of reg-
ulatory authorities; ability to provide services to clients; to manage ties to customers or partners; and capacity for
manufacturing.
We explored how and why these constructs led to further research and/or development investment in the technological
assets of the acquired ﬁrm in the host country after acquisition, and focused on three aspects of this investment: preservation
of the target business unit; retention or redundancy of scientists and other technical staff; and investment in development of
acquired drug programs or in facilities or capital equipment of the target ﬁrm. We combined data from open-ended and
closed questions in interviews on the extent to which the target ﬁrms’ patent assignees (whose names have been identiﬁed
from patent data) were retained post-acquisition, and on the percentage of the R&D budget of the combined entity invested
in the target’s projects. We focused on innovation inputs rather than intermediate (e.g., patents) or ﬁnal (e.g., new drugs)
outputs, given the length of time and the uncertainty involved in product development.
Findings
Here we present the case study data on the three main constructs that we develop: i) technology similarity/comple-
mentarity; ii) similarity/complementarity of the discovery and development capabilities; and iii) investment in the acquired
ﬁrms’ technological assets post-acquisition.4 There can be several weaknesses of patent-based metrics. First, a patent is one form of protection of innovation but much of a ﬁrm’s technical
knowledge may remain unpatentable; it can be seen as an intermediate output resulting from inputs of resources into R&D; and there are differences in
patents between countries and sectors in the importance of patents and variation in the technological and economic value embodied in individual patent
(Basberg, 1987; Griliches, 1990; Pavitt, 1985; Piscitello, 2004). Second, it has been shown that there is imprecision from patent-based relatedness measures
when applied outside the most frequently patenting ﬁrms (Benner and Waldfogel, 2008). Third, there are additional considerations that apply to patents in
the biotechnology sector in particular (see Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Ko, 1992).
Table 3
Technology and capabilities similarity and complementarity (interview evidence)
Case Technology Discovery and development capabilities
1 Similar
Acquirer and target both involved in services but target had
developed ADME services
Complementary
Target’s safety and efﬁcacy testing ﬁlled gap in acquirer’s services
offering
2 Similar
Acquirer and target both involved in cellular therapies of wound
care, technology used to produce cell component similar,
technology to produce delivery of drug different
Similar
Similar capabilities of target and acquirer in drug development
(preclinical and clinical R&D, regulatory processes, small-scale
manufacturing and regulatory experience)
3 Complementary
Different technologies: target’s ﬁeld pain/sedation, acquirer’s ﬁeld
stroke, but complementary in that both involved in intravenous,
acute, hospital drugs
Similar
Similar competences of target and acquirer (management of preclinical
and clinical trials, safety and efﬁcacy testing, quality control) but target
“ran in lighter mode”
4 Complementary
Different technologies: target’s ﬁeld antibacterials, acquirer’s ﬁeld
antivirals, but complementary in that both involved in anti-infective
drugs
Complementary
Through acquisition, target gained access to complementary assets
(including toxicology, chemistry and biology of buyer) to do in-house
clinical testing and acquirer gained access to relations of target to
research sponsor
5 Similar
Technological platforms were similar, similar methods for doing
molecular biology
Complementary
Through acquisition, acquirer gained access to target’s collaborations
with large pharmaceutical ﬁrm and expertise with European and US
regulation and target gained capabilities to scale up
6 Similar
Target and acquirer used same delivery system but for vaccines for
different types of cancer
Similar
Firms had similar capabilities in drug development (safety and efﬁcacy
testing and clinical trials)
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From our analysis of the data, it emerged that Cases 1, 2, 5 and 6 involved technology similarity between target and
acquirer. In Case 1, the target ﬁrm expanded from platform services to drug product discovery and development, and ADME
(absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion) testing of molecules. Following funding difﬁculties, the target ﬁrm
rationalized its focus to services only, and was thereafter acquired by the buyer, a larger international biopharmaceutical ﬁrm
offering a comprehensive suite of discovery products and services.We concentrated on the target ﬁrm’s ADME services which
were similar to the buyer’s technological knowledge but ﬁlled a gap in the services offered by the acquirer, which had a full-
service subsidiary based in the UK (the other part of the target was rationalized and divested). The patent analysis supported
our conclusion and showed a technological similarity index of 0.73, much higher than the complementarity index of 0.13.
(Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results from the interviews and the patent analysis respectively).
At its founding in 1999, the target ﬁrm in Case 2 licensed technology (compounds) from UK universities, and spent ten
years developing drug programs in skin repair and regeneration, including wound care and hair regeneration, their lead
program completing Phase II clinical trials. After disappointing results from Phase III clinical trials of their lead program, the
board of directors decided to sell the ﬁrm. The target was unsuccessful in selling the ﬁrm as a whole, and sold the different
technological assets to various biotechnology and large pharmaceutical ﬁrms for a fraction of their value. Three of the lead
programs were sold to two separate biotechnology ﬁrms (acquirers were avoiding “misﬁts”: see Anokhin et al., 2011). A
subsidiary business of the target focused on stem cell research was sold to a large pharmaceutical ﬁrm, and the last drug
development program in early stage was taken over by the target’s founder. We focused on the acquisition of the two lead
drug programs in wound care sold to a biotechnology ﬁrm. From the interview data, we saw a high level of technological
similarity between the acquirer and the target ﬁrm. The chief scientiﬁc ofﬁcer and founder of the target ﬁrm explained that
the acquirer was “already experienced in cellular therapies and there aren’t many companies in the world that are in cellular
therapies of wound care so they were one of maybe four or ﬁve companies that could have possibly purchased this and
pursued it.” Patent data showed no similarity or complementarity in this case. This ﬁnding reﬂects not only the very fewTable 4
Technology similarity and complementarity (patents)
Case Acquirer patents (5 years) Target patents (5 years) Technology similarity Technology complementarity
1 58 24 0.73 0.13
2 2 6 0.00 0.00
3 8 2 0.00 0.90
4 8 6 0.49 0.27
5 119 2 0.11 0.23
6 19 5 0.74 0.13
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knowledge included in patent application records.
In Case 5, the target ﬁrm developed a diagnostic kit by collaborating with a large pharmaceutical ﬁrm. The diagnostic kit
was used to determine the effectiveness of drug therapies for cancer, and the target ﬁrm had ﬁrst-mover advantage
because its product became a regulated diagnostic. The target ﬁrm, however, could not expand rapidly enough to keep up
with the demand for their product, and entered into a distribution and marketing collaboration with another large
pharmaceutical ﬁrm. At this time, the target ﬁrm was approached and acquired by another medium-sized diagnostic ﬁrm
producing molecular biology tools, with a diagnostic division (excelling at HPV testing) with similar methods for doing
molecular biology. It had developed a product that competed in the same market as the target’s, but was considered to be
harder to use and less sensitive than the target’s product. In this instance, the patent indices of similarity and comple-
mentarity were rather close to each other and did not square well with the interview evidence. We brought this to the
attention of our interviewee. When asked about this discrepancy, the representative of the acquirer argued that, although
the two patents of the target were potentially valuable, they referred to the target’s technology platform and not the
diagnostic product, which was not patented. Furthermore, the patents reﬂected technology that had not been researched
further, and were a somewhat poor representation of the overall knowledge base of the target ﬁrm. The technology object
of our analysis was hard to patent but also hard to copy. In the words of the target ﬁrm’s chief scientiﬁc ofﬁcer, the
technology implied “experience running through processes, being familiar with the technology, having the expertise of
how to document, perform the work, put everything down so that the FDA [U.S. Food and Administration] can be happy
with how everything has been documented”.
In Case 6, at the time of the acquisition, the target ﬁrm was developing three vaccines: one for use in melanoma, one for
hepatitis B, and one for HIV. The ﬁrst two programs had passed through Phase I and Phase II clinical trials, but there was
limited interest in these potential drug products from large pharmaceutical ﬁrms, and, faced with increasing development
costs, the target ﬁrm decided to enter a trade sale. The acquiring ﬁrm was developing a cancer vaccine based on a protein
called 5T4 and found primarily on cancer cells, all except melanoma. By acquiring the target’s melanoma vaccine, the
acquirer broadened its pipeline in a wider variety of cancer vaccines. Representatives of both the target and the acquirer
explained that the products were based on very similar underlying technology. The target ﬁrm explained that the viral
vector in both technologies underlying the products was MVA, and that “[the technology] was not exactly the same thing
but it is the same material. They knew how to make MVA.” A further indication of the technological similarity of target and
buyer was that, prior to the acquisition, there was a patent dispute regarding the target’s platform technology. When the
target ﬁled for the patent, the acquirer, along with ﬁve other ﬁrms, opposed the patent, claiming it was invalid due to prior
art. The patent was upheld but those ﬁve ﬁrms appealed, and between the opposition hearing and the appeal, the
acquiring ﬁrm acquired the target. The acquiring ﬁrm was able to maintain the patent claims. Patent analysis supported
this classiﬁcation and showed a technological similarity index of 0.74, much higher than the complementarity index of
0.13.
Cases 3 and 4 were cases of technological complementarity. In Case 3, at the time of the acquisition, the target ﬁrm had
three clinical development programs in the central nervous system ﬁeld and focused on sedatives; e.g., post-operative pain
and chronic pain. The acquiring ﬁrm had a lead program on stroke that had just failed Phase III clinical trials, and, as a public
company, attracted negative press and reduced the ﬁrm’s market value. The acquirer was therefore interested in acquiring
drug programs “for example in central nervous system or thromboses” that could be further developed without a lot of risk.
The technology complementarity was acknowledged by both the target and acquirer ﬁrms. The former chief scientiﬁc ofﬁcer
of the target ﬁrm explained the complementarity in these terms: “There is some similarity, they are hospital products,
intravenous and acute… [and] they were central nervous system. [But] stroke [therapeutic area of the acquirer] and pain and
sedation [therapeutic areas of the target] are quite different areas.” Thus, technology problem-solving was focused on
different but complementary therapeutic ﬁelds, as the eventual drug products would be developed and then marketed, and
administered, similarly (through hospitals, and intravenously). Patent analysis supported this classiﬁcation and showed a
technological complementarity index of 0.90, much higher than the zero similarity index.
In Case 4, at the time of the acquisition, the target ﬁrm had two early stage drug programs in antibacterials. The acquiring
ﬁrmwas specialized in antivirals. As in Case 3, where the common factor was the central nervous system, the common factor
in Case 4 was anti-infective drugs. Again, as in Case 3, the speciﬁc therapeutic focus within the common ﬁeld was quite
different. The target ﬁrm characterized the complementarity as: “We haven’t really explored too much about their anti-viral
discovery in the same way that most of our virologists haven’t had much experience in anti-bacterials.” By acquiring the
target ﬁrm, the acquirer broadened their pipeline in anti-infective drugs. However, the patent analysis did not correspond
with the evidence from the interview data. The patent analysis showed a higher index of technology similarity comparedwith
the complementarity index. When asked about the discrepancy with the patent analysis, the chief scientiﬁc ofﬁcer of the
target ﬁrm justiﬁed the technological complementarity: “the compounds that are patented may be the same but they are put
together differently for different uses”.
Discovery and development capabilities similarity/complementarity
From our case study evidence, it emerged that, in Cases 2, 3 and 6, there was a similarity of capabilities between target and
acquirer (see Table 3). In Case 2, the ﬁrms were developing drug products and were specialized in the ﬁeld of regenerative
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candidates from preclinical to Phase III clinical trials, and the acquiring ﬁrm, having developed and launched drug products on
the market, had drug development capabilities in preclinical R&D, clinical R&D, small-scale manufacturing for clinical trials,
and experience with regulatory procedures. Additionally, since the acquirer had already marketed products, it had developed
substantial sales and marketing capabilities.
In Case 3, the target and acquirer ﬁrms were developing drugs in the central nervous system area. Both ﬁrms prior to the
acquisitionwere carrying out activities related to producing drug products, namely themanagement of preclinical and clinical
trials, safety and efﬁcacy testing, and quality control. However, the acquirer was operating on a larger scale than the target:
“what they had is something similar to what we had but we ran in an extremely light fashion, an under-resourced fashion.”
Furthermore, the target ﬁrm explained the similarity of their activities: “The [acquirer’s] clinical development expertise
is very good…but it is not bad here. There isn’t any particular thing that they do that we couldn’t get somewhere else or that
we didn’t do beforehand. There is a lot of commonality in the type of work we do.” However, some of the capabilities of the
target ﬁrm were superior, such as preclinical R&D and quality management, which became the company standard post-
acquisition. Also, personnel in the target ﬁrm had more experience collaborating with large pharmaceutical ﬁrms than
those of the acquirer. The acquirer had superior capabilities in clinical development, and experience with regulatory
procedures.
Also, in Case 6, both ﬁrms had capabilities in drug development, e.g., safety and efﬁcacy testing and clinical trials. The
founder of the target ﬁrm explained that, “how it works is in the public domain. We can make the stuff… anyone can do that”
but he further explained that owning the intellectual property and being able to defend it was the “real value”. The acquiring
ﬁrm substantiated this claim by saying they had all the in-house expertise and skills because they were developing a very
similar product, and that they “already knew what to do with it”, as proof of having the required (and similar) capabilities.
In contrast, Cases 1, 4 and 5 showed evidence of complementarity of capabilities between target and acquirer. In Case 1,
the target ﬁrm offered services based on two different technologies: one based on proprietary technology (computer-based
drug discovery), the other based on generic technology to determine proper dosing (safety and efﬁcacy testing). The
acquiring ﬁrm acquired both technologies, but was primarily interested in the safety and efﬁcacy testing in order to extend
its service offering to its customers, and has since divested the computer-based drug discovery service. The acquisition
extended the scope of their services, as the service that was acquired required specialist knowledge the acquirer did not
have. The target ﬁrm described their safety and efﬁcacy testing service as having “specialists in knowing when something is
going to get into the bloodstream and then when it’s in the bloodstream how quickly it’s removed.” This type of testing is
generally required for FDA approval of drugs, and the acquirer was “relatively weak” in this service area. And, although the
customers of this safety and efﬁcacy testing service tend to be regional (80% of the target’s customers), the acquirer had
successfully gained new service sales from its existing customer base that had begun to use the safety and efﬁcacy testing
service.
In Case 4, both ﬁrmswere developing drug products (one in antivirals, the other in antibacterials), and both ﬁrms had been
carrying out activities related to drug development. However, the target ﬁrm had less experience with larger-scale clinical
trials, as its products were still in the preclinical development stage. The acquirer had drug products in Phase II clinical trials
and had amuch larger organizationwith in-house chemists. The target ﬁrm described the acquirer and target as having “quite
a high degree of common language and processes.” He explained further that this was “partially due to a fairly large pro-
portion of their scientists coming from the UK and having a shared approach.” The two ﬁrms made an effort to integrate their
businesses without disturbing their capabilities: “They [the acquirer] are quite different in the therapeutic areas in processes
and assays…making sure that we use similar platforms for ourselves so, for instance, if we have the same assay, we should
call it the same name.” The acquirer contributed with project management systems, and there was an important effort to
harmonize assays and other processes including occupational health and safety systems. With the acquisition, the target
acquired access to internal toxicology, chemistry, biology, clinical development, and business development. The target
contributed with both technology and market knowledge in developing products in a new therapeutic area with signiﬁcant
funding from theWellcome Trust: “I think there is an added value to having people focused on the area, like I’ve been doing in
this area for about ﬁfteen years and so you have to understand the market, you’ve seen results, you’ve seen people make
mistakes so you don’t need tomake them again in this area. It is that kind of developed experience I think that is harder to put
down.”
Lastly, in Case 5, the target and acquirer ﬁrms produced diagnostic products, and the acquirer bought the target ﬁrm in
order to expand into a newmarket of companion diagnostics (diagnostic products used in conjunction with prescribing new
drugs). The acquirer contributed with more standardized processes related to harmonization of product development, reg-
ulatory approval and quality control, and more supporting functions, such as marketing and sales, and general human
resource management. The increasing market demand for the target’s diagnostic product required rapid expansion to meet
U.S. FDA requirements that was very difﬁcult for the target ﬁrm to manage prior to the acquisition. The target ﬁrm
acknowledged that there were gaps: “nobody grows at that rate without leaving some holes.” The expertise and knowledge
from the acquirer ﬁrmd in regards to ﬁrst the European regulation, and later the FDA processesd were crucial to scale up
the target’s manufacturing operations. The acquirer realized it had been less successful than the target in this market, and
intended to keep the target’s local facility as a “center of excellence”. The acquirer also realized that a large portion of the value
of the acquired technological assets resided in the relationships the target’s top management had with large pharmaceutical
ﬁrms, and their ability to enter funded R&D collaborations with these ﬁrms. The acquirer acknowledged this by stating that
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but did not have staff with large pharmaceutical experience to build relationships at the higher levels, the vice-president
level. The top management from the target ﬁrm had experience in working with large pharmaceutical ﬁrms, and knowl-
edge and expertise related to acquiring and building large pharmaceutical R&D partnerships.
Investment in targets’ technology assets post-acquisition
In Cases 3 and 4, there was an expansion of R&D in the UK. In Case 3, our evidence showed retention of the full technical
and scientiﬁc staff of the target and substantial investment in the development of the acquired drug programs:“Wedecided right from the start that wewould focus our investment on one [target’s] asset-… a preclinical asset…We
have been able tomove it forward very rapidly.We have done three clinical trials; the fourth clinical trial is on the verge
of being launched. Due to our overall ﬁnancial situation, we were not able to invest into [the other programs]. There
were three more assets… [For] one we did some regulatory, very broad re-analysis and want to partner this. [Another]
had nearly completed an ongoing Phase II trial but… this would probably not be very partnerable without us taking
very high development risksdwe decided to stop [investing]…There was a very early program…which we stopped
right from the start because running one program is requiring all the focus of the team”.Post-acquisition, the target and acquirer ﬁrms integrated these activities across country borders. According to the acquirer,
the decisions of who was responsible for which activities were based on the “background and experience level of people”
across the target and acquirer. This resulted in some staff redundancies in the acquirer’s location. Given the high level of
similarity in capabilities (with the target even having some superior capabilities than the acquirer), the combined entity was
reorganized to allow cross-country, cross-location reporting structure, with the heads in the target ﬁrm responsible for some
activities.
Initially, the acquirer invested in all of the acquired assets in order to determine which program would provide the best
return on investment. In the end, they invested primarily in one drug program, which they progressed, post-acquisition, from
preclinical to Phase II. This level of product development required substantial investment. The combined entity invested 50%
of its R&D budget in the target’s projects. They retained most of the target’s staff post-acquisition, although there were some
redundancies in the acquirer’s ﬁrm. The retention of patent-assignees was 100%. The target location became a UK subsidiary
for the acquiring ﬁrm (see Table 5).
In Case 4, the acquirer maintained and further invested in the programs and associated capabilities of the target ﬁrm,
which were highly valued by the acquirer: “The [specialized] function is exclusively performed in the UK, adopted without
change. It is ﬁt for purpose and it is world class.” In this case, there was further research and development of the two target
ﬁrm’s drug programs (both in pre-clinical stages). Since acquisition, the combined entity invested 30% of its R&D budget in the
target’s projects in the target’s research programs. All staff was retained, including 100% of the patent-assignees, and the
target ﬁrm’s location became a subsidiary for the acquirer ﬁrm.
In Cases 1 and 5, there was continuation of development operations, but no further investment in research in the UK. In
Case 1, in which a services business was acquired, the acquirer ﬁrm invested primarily in staff and facilities. All of the staff
related to performing the activities for the service were retained, about ﬁfteen people in total, and were moved to the
acquirer ﬁrm’s subsidiary in the UK. Nevertheless, the target ﬁrm informed us that ﬁve of the retained staff had left and
spun out a new business. The acquirer made no further investment in developing the acquired technology. The target’s
revenues were re-invested mainly to continue and expand the provision of services through facilities, staff recruitment and
equipment maintenance, but not to carry out further research. The combined entity retained 26% of the target’s patent
assignees.
In Case 5, which involves the diagnostic product ﬁrms, all staff was retained. The acquirer invested about 3% of the R&D
budget of the combined entity for product development, primarily in staff and facilities for this purpose. It did not invest in
further research. The combined entity lost 80% (4 out of 5) of the target’s patent assignees in the acquisition process. The
target ﬁrm relocated to new facilities in the UK, forming a new UK subsidiary. There was also considerable investment in
increasing the headcount at the UK location, from approximately 70 staff at the time of acquisition to 140 (the amount of staff
doing product development has risen from 20 to 53, which was necessary to meet FDA requirements).
Finally, in Cases 2 and 6, the target R&D projects were either shifted away to the home country of the acquirer or
completely terminated. In Case 2, in which two drug programs were acquired, there was evidence of investment in product
development but in the acquirer’s home country. There was a high level of staff redundancy (the target ﬁrm originally had
grown to 70 employees, but had already contracted to approximately 25 by the time of acquisition). The acquirer ﬁrm did not
retain any scientists from the target ﬁrm, except for the temporary hire of the key scientist of the target ﬁrm to act as a
consultant. The technology transferred included documentation and physical products, such as cell banks and specialized
equipment, but also know-how, as scientists from the acquirer went to the target’s location to work with other key scientists
to transfer knowledge about procedures and processes. Although there was no retention of staff or patent assignees from the
target ﬁrm, nor investment in facilities or equipment, the acquirer indicated that they were investing approximately 20% of
their R&D resources in early pre-clinical development for one of the drug programs of the target ﬁrm in the home country.
The other drug program was in late-stage development and had completed Phase III, but with negative results. The acquirer
was re-evaluating the program and was uncertain if there would be further development.
Table 5
Investment in acquired technology assets
Case Preservation of
target
Target staff
retention/
redundancy
% of target
patent
assignees
retained
Acquirer staff
redundancy
Investment in
target’s
technology
% of R&D budget
of combined
entity invested
in target’s
technology (in
home or host
country)
Further research and
development in
acquired technological
assets in host country
4 Established UK
subsidiary
through target
Retained full
scientiﬁc and
technical staff of
target
100 Advancement of
target’s early
phase drug
programs
30
3 Established UK
subsidiary
through target
Retained full
scientiﬁc and
technical staff of
target
100 Some staff from
acquirer made
redundant,
reorganization
of reporting
Advancement of
target’s drug
program from
preclinical to
Phase II
50
Further development in
acquired technological
assets in host country
1 Target staff
transferred to
buyer’s UK
subsidiary
Retained full
scientiﬁc and
technical staff of
target
5 original staff from
target left to spin
out new business
26 Investment in
facilities and
equipment
11
5 Established an
additional UK
subsidiary
through target
ﬁrm
Retained full
scientiﬁc and
technical staff of
target
Increased scientiﬁc
staff working on
product
development
Increased
manufacturing staff
20 Investment in
facilities and
equipment
3
No further research or
development in
acquired technological
assets in host country
2 No All staff made
redundant
Key scientist
retained
temporarily as a
consultant
0 Feasibility
investment in
one of the target’s
drug program
Investment in
R&D shifted to
home country of
acquirer
20
6 No All staff made
redundant
Key scientist and IP
manager retained
temporarily to
transfer
documentation
0 No 0
M. Miozzo et al. / Long Range Planning 49 (2016) 221e240 233In Case 6, there was no further investment in technological development, staff or facilities of the target post-acquisition.
The target’s staff was made redundant, retaining none of the patent assignees, although a key scientist and IP manager were
retained for a year to transfer the documentation. In this case, the acquirer experienced some ﬁnancial difﬁculty following
disappointing results in Phase III studies of their main cancer vaccine, which occurred shortly after the acquisition of the
target ﬁrm. Facing ﬁnancial constraints, the acquirer was not in a position to invest in further development of the target’s R&D
projects. We concluded at the time of the interview that the acquirer was not using the acquired technology assets, but was
looking for partners to out-license those technology assets.Discussion
We asked the question: What happens to the technological resources and assets of science-based ﬁrms when they are
acquired by foreign ﬁrms? We investigated this by drawing on evidence from six case studies of acquisitions of UK bio-
pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Table 6 plots the similarity/complementarity of the technology against that of the discovery and
development capabilities in each pair of acquiring and target ﬁrms. In a rather speculative fashion, the basic picture that
emerges is of four ideal types of knowledge base combinations: i) technology- and capabilities-enhancing (consistent with Case
4); ii) technology-enhancing (consistent with Case 3); iii) capabilities-enhancing (consistent with Cases 1 and 5); and iv) non-
technology- and non-capabilities-enhancing (consistent with Cases 2 and 6). Our ﬁndings contribute to advancing the
Table 6
Knowledge base combinations and effects on post-acquisition investment
Discovery and development capabilities
Complementary Similar
Technology Complementary Technology- and capabilities-enhancing
Expansion of R&D in host country
(home-base-augmenting)
Technology-enhancing
Expansion of R&D in host country (home-base-replacing)
Similar Capabilities-enhancing
Continuation of development operations
(D but no R) in host country
Non-technology- and non-capabilities-enhancing
Termination/shift away of R&D from host country
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capabilities have different outcomes regarding further investment in, or shift of, the target’s R&D. Next, we discuss the four
ideal types.
In what we call technology-enhancing combinations d involving complementary technology but similar discovery and
development capabilitiesd acquisitions reﬂect a strategic intent to explore new technological knowledge domains.We argue
that these combinations create a potential for R&D “exploration” through experimentation with new alternatives (Grant,
1996; March, 1991; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001), and for inventions emerging from the integration and redeployment
of the components from the amalgamated knowledge base (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). The combinations require the
buyer to invest further in the target R&D projects in order to absorb the tacit, complex and embedded complementary
knowledge. These acquisitions provide the target with opportunities to access complementary skills and resources for clinical
development, and the buyer with opportunities to renew its knowledge base and diversify its product pipeline by developing
projects in complementary technology areas. These acquisitions may be designed to “replace” some knowledge of the
acquirer, especially when they experience a setback, such as a failed clinical trial. The similarity of the discovery and
development capabilities between the buyer and target ﬁrmmay facilitate the integration of processes, methods, and systems
related to clinical development. The acquisition of a ﬁrm with similar capabilities, however, may lead to reorganization and
rationalization of the combined entity, and some redundancy of staff in either the buyer or target ﬁrm.
In capabilities-enhancing knowledge base combinationsd involving similar technology but complementary discovery and
development capabilities d acquisitions reﬂect a strategic intent to explore new product market domains (Bower, 2001).
These combinations can be explained as an acquisition strategy aimed at further “exploitation” of the extant knowledge bases
(March, 1991) through the adoption of complementary discovery and development capabilities. In these cases, we see the
continuation of development operations, but not further investment in basic research in the target’s R&D projects. These
acquisitions may be designed to take advantage of scale and scope economies and efﬁciency improvements, through scaling
up operations and acquiring complementary manufacturing or service capabilities. The motivation to maintain the target
ﬁrms’ operations stems primarily from the embedded tacit knowledge of the staff in the acquired ﬁrms, such as in Case 5,
where the valuable collaborative relationships with large pharmaceutical ﬁrms constituted a large part of the acquired value.
As such, the target ﬁrm’s development activities may be continued, but there is little inventive output.
In technology- and capabilities-enhancing combinations d involving complementary technology and complementary
discovery and development capabilities d the acquisition emphasizes both “exploration” and “exploitation”. Further in-
vestment in the R&D projects of the target is necessary for the further development of promising target projects. Such ac-
quisitions may be part of a platform or buy-and-build strategy, where an initial acquisition provides the acquirer with a
foothold in a new domain and the option to build on that platform with further internal investment or a series of follow-on
acquisitions (Haspelagh and Jemison, 1991; Smit, 2001). As such, these acquisitions are knowledge-seeking, and designed to
“augment” the technology and capability base of the acquirer (Kuemmerle, 1999).
Finally, in non-technology- and non-capabilities-enhancing combinations, the potential for “exploration” or “exploitation”
may be limited. Here, effort is done to “transfer” or “translate” the intellectual property documentation to the buyer, but the
retention of technical and scientiﬁc staff is not seen as necessary to continue the exploitation of these capabilities. These
acquisitions represent attempts to deal with the escalating drug development costs and risks (e.g., DiMasi et al., 2003), or to
increase market power and reduce competitive rivalry. In these cases, we see either the shifting away of the target R&D
activity to the home country of the acquirer, or the outright termination of the target R&D projects. Thus, the opportunities for
recombination of knowledge-base assets/resources are limited, and there is little contribution to the innovation output post-
acquisition. Our ﬁndings showed that, although similar knowledge bases (both in terms of technology and discovery and
development capabilities) may be easily integrated and require minimal resources to do so, the increase in innovative output
was also minimal.
Our research draws on and also questions some of the ﬁndings of existing research on the effect of knowledge relatedness
on innovation in M&As (Makri et al., 2010). In particular, it builds on the insight that similarity and complementarity of
technology have an effect on innovation outcomes following acquisition, but goes beyond this by incorporating into the
framework the important role played by similarity and complementarity of capabilities between ﬁrms in innovation
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of science-based ﬁrms interact and affect investment in the target ﬁrm’s R&D post-acquisition. This framework can
encompass the different motives, processes and outcomes in technology-motivated M&As, and is therefore able to cast light
onmechanisms ignored by earlier studies. For example, it casts light on the difference inmotives and processes betweenwhat
we call technology- and capabilities-enhancing knowledge-base combinations (in which acquirers seek to “augment” their
knowledge) and technology-enhancing knowledge-base combinations (in which acquirers seek to “renew” or “replace” their
knowledge), with implications for the nature of the R&D reorganization process. Our framework also explains the reasons for
the continuation of only the development operations (as opposed to further research) of target ﬁrms in the host country in the
case of capabilities-enhancing knowledge base combinations, in contrast to the cases with complementary technology. Finally,
it explains the motives for and processes of termination or shift of R&D from the host country in the case of similarity of
technology and of discovery and development capabilities. These issues have not been explored by earlier studies of
knowledge-relatedness in M&As.
Our conceptual framework has importantmanagement implications. Promising target R&D projects (which could have led
to much-needed drugs) may be discontinued due to similarity in technology and capabilities, to the dismay of scientists in
target ﬁrms. These outcomes are not necessarily foreseen by the acquirer and target senior managers, and do not necessarily
reﬂect their initial strategic intent, but instead emerge from the process of post-acquisition rationalization and reorganization
of R&D. The theoretical predictions and practical implications of this framework resonate with the literature emphasizing the
decisive role the acquired ﬁrms’ senior managers can play by championing opportunities for resource reconﬁguration and
synergy (Graebner, 2004; Graebner et al., 2010). Our conceptual framework highlights the importance for the acquired ﬁrms’
senior managers to be able to evaluate, select and promote actively their most valuable R&D projects, in order to maximize
the chance of survival and follow-on investment.
Implications for the local science and technology system
Our analytical framework allows us to distinguish between the different outcomes in terms of implications for the local
science and technology system, and therefore also has signiﬁcant policy implications. Technology- and capabilities-enhancing
and technology-enhancing knowledge base combinations have positive effects on the local science and technology system as
buyers are keen to access the product- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets, and further investment is directed towards R&D of the ac-
quired ﬁrms’ technology in the host country. The tacit nature of knowledge in science-based ﬁrms requires the buyer to retain
this knowledge, which is embedded and location-bound in scientists and their personal relationships, and constrains buyers
from shifting R&D activities away from the host country of the target ﬁrm or centralizing it in the buyer’s home country
(Carayannopoulos and Auster, 2010; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Pisano, 1991). Proximity to qualiﬁed universities or other
research organizations that deliver this kind of tacit, cognitive knowledge, and to clusters of ﬁrms operating in the same and
in complementary sectors (including the availability of experts in intellectual property or regulatory issues), is crucial to
accessing this knowledge (Balconi et al., 2007; Casper, 2007; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004).
Therefore, for acquisitions involving access to complementary technology, the combined entity will have the imperative to
remain and continue R&D activities in the host country.
The picture is different for capabilities-enhancing knowledge base combinations. In these acquisitions, although the tar-
get’s technological knowledge base is kept intact and local operations tend to be continued by forming a subsidiary in the host
country, the buyer ﬁrm invests little in further research regarding the acquired technology. The target ﬁrm’s ties to the client
or supplier base, for example, provide a strong rationale to maintain operations in the host country, but, in this combination,
the combined entity does not seek to explore, create and absorb new knowledge from R&D projects of the target ﬁrm, or
allocate new resources to these research activities.
For the ﬁnal, non-technology- and non-capabilities-enhancing type, the R&D activities of the target are eliminated or shifted
away from the host country. This avoids redundancies and duplications in the combined entity, resulting in the loss of skilled
employment and the suppression of the target’s technological assets (unless target assets are readily re-deployable for
alternative uses).
Our ﬁndings highlight the importance for policy to encourage and support regional innovative capabilities embedded in
virtual laboratories in the form of broad and deep networks of operational, technological and scientiﬁc researchers that cut
across ﬁrms and universities, encouraging technological diversity and new ﬁrm creation (Almeida and Kogut,1999; Audretsch
and Feldman,1996; Best, 2001; Casper, 2007; Saxenian,1994). Encouraging development of these regional specializations and
capabilities is especially necessary in countries that invest heavily in sustaining a strong and healthy science base, but face
challenges in the ability to commercialize and beneﬁt from the economic impact of science and innovation. Regions that
invest in policies that support and develop these capabilities and networks may strengthen the ability to appropriate value,
even when their ﬁrms are acquired by foreign ﬁrms.
Limitations and implications for future research
Our study offers newconceptual insights on the different knowledge base combinations that can affect further investment,
continuation or suppression of target ﬁrms’ R&D projects. We acknowledge the challenges to test empirically and extend the
analytical framework developed in this study. A major challenge for a large-scale empirical testing is the operationalization of
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rely on both interview and patent data, suggest that caution must be applied to the adoption of widely used objective
measures of acquirer and target ﬁrm innovation characteristics. While previous studies have relied on patents to analyze the
effect of technology relatedness on post-acquisition innovation outcomes (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001), we ﬁnd that the
innovation-related proxies based on patents and case study evidence did not always lead to identical ﬁndings when studying
smaller biopharmaceutical ﬁrms. To some extent, these discrepancies can be attributed to the general criticism of the reli-
ability of patent data as ameasure of economic value and their corresponding result in practical applications. In particular, the
evidence shows that smaller ﬁrmsd as is the case formost of the target ﬁrms in our studyd have a lower propensity to apply
for patents, perhaps reﬂecting the costs of the patenting process and the availability of internal legal capacity (Kleinknecht
et al., 2002). Our ﬁndings suggest that patent-based proxies for technological knowledge capture a small part of a ﬁrm’s
knowledge base and sometimes not the core technology of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, patent-based indicators can be obscured by
strategic behavior; ﬁrms may seek patent protection to prevent a competitor from using a particular technology. Biophar-
maceutical ﬁrms rely on extensive and detailed documentation and “standard operating procedures” related to each step of
the drug discovery and development process. As a result, much knowledge integration and transfer occurs through an
interpretation of the documentation trail of clinical testing between the buyer and target ﬁrms. Our study illustrates that,
even in acquisitions involving similarity in both technology and capabilities, the transfer of patents was not enough to ensure
the exclusive use of the technology, and the retention of key scientists or intellectual property specialists was necessary in
order to “transfer” or “translate” the intellectual property. These key scientists were retained temporarily, despite the fact that
all other staff was made redundant.
An even greater challenge is the operationalization of the discovery and development capabilities. As argued above, ca-
pabilities and routines are distributed in organizations and involve different participants performing different activities and
who have different understandings of those capabilities. These constructs cannot be derived from existing large-scale data
sources, and inevitably demand close scrutiny regarding the types of ﬁrm skills, history and experience. Nevertheless, we
have provided a starting point for articulating into the analysis the particular capabilities for discovery and development that
reﬂect biopharmaceutical ﬁrms’ ability to perform their activities. It is possible to collect information on ﬁrms’ clinical trials,
products and services from specialized databases, ﬁrms’websites, or articles in trade journals, which can give some indication
on the ability of ﬁrms to conduct clinical trials, safety and efﬁcacy testing, the experience of ﬁrms in the management of
regulatory authorities (if they have regulated products), provision of services or engagement in manufacturing. Nevertheless,
it is difﬁcult to derive from these data sources reliable information on ﬁrm capabilities. To gather this kind of information,
case-by-case analysis is required (e.g., through the implementation of a dedicated survey). Databases on clinical trials can also
be used to explore outcomes, as it may be possible to tracewhether target projects have proceeded through clinical trials after
acquisition. Another alternative to explore outcomes is to trace the careers of scientists through business-oriented social
networking services, in order to investigate whether scientists from the target ﬁrm continue to work in the acquirer.
We developed the conceptual categories of our framework from an examination of cross-border acquisition cases. One
question is the extent towhich this frameworkmay be applicable to all acquisitions, including domestic ones. The inclusion of
Case 6 for control purposes shows that the impact of domestic acquisitions can also be explored using this framework.
However, it is possible that, by designing the study for cross-border acquisitions, the likelihood of ﬁnding cases with com-
plementary technology and discovery and development capabilities was increased because of regional/national technological
specialization and path dependencies (see Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). If the study were extended to more domestic
acquisitions, we expect there would be more instances of non-technology- and non-capabilities-enhancing deals, where the
primary motive would be to reduce rivalry.
Another question is the extent to which this frameworkmay be applicable to other sectors, especially other science-based
sectors, such as nanotechnology and energy technologies. Firms in these sectors also have complex scientiﬁc knowledge bases
requiring integration across disciplines and functional areas of expertise. However, in other industries where there are
numerous competing technologies and more advanced markets for know-how, ﬁrms may rely less heavily on acquisition as a
means of accessing technology assets, and some of the variables considered here, such as the complementarity/similarity of
technologies and capabilities, may play a less important role. It may be easier to expect similar results from cases in other
science-based sectors which share similarities to biotechnology in terms of high-technological opportunities, high-
appropriability conditions, and low cumulativeness, rather than in those which face more dynamic increasing returns,
such as software (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997). If the analysis were to be applied in a different science-based sector, the types
of organizational capabilities would also be different; for example, rather than discovery and development capabilities, ca-
pabilities for product development and for commercialization of innovation could be more relevant.
Finally, a subject for further research is how these practices differ cross-nationally, depending on the institutions of home
and host country. National institutions in the host country affect the ability of the acquirer to reorganize the target and
leverage its assets (Capron and Guillen, 2009). It would be interesting to explore whether national institutions affect these
determinants in a similar or different fashion, in terms of impact on the investment in the acquired ﬁrm’s technology.
Conclusion
This paper examined what happens to technological assets and capabilities of science-based ﬁrms after a cross-border
acquisition takes place. Case study data from six biopharmaceutical ﬁrms in the UK provided insights to derive four ideal
M. Miozzo et al. / Long Range Planning 49 (2016) 221e240 237types of knowledge base combinations of cross-border acquisitions, and the effects of these on the further investment or
suppression of the target’s technological assets.
This study contributes to conceptual discussions of technology-related acquisitions, and has important management and
policy implications. We contribute to this literature by underlining the role both technology and discovery and development
capabilities play in the further development of the acquired ﬁrm’s technological assets and capabilities in the host country,
post-acquisition. Our ﬁndings imply that the acquiring- and acquired-ﬁrms’ managers need to be aware and capable of
dealing with inherent biases in the acquisition process against the continuation of even the most promising target R&D
projects, when there is a high degree of similarity in technology and capabilities between the two ﬁrms. Furthermore, the
tacit knowledge embedded in target scientists and their relationships with universities, ﬁrms and laboratories provide the
target with unique location-bound competitive advantages that increase the likelihood of investment in the target’s tech-
nological assets. Regions that invest in policies that support and develop these networks can strengthen the ability to
appropriate value from science-based ﬁrms’ technological assets, even if they are acquired by foreign ﬁrms.Acknowledgements
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